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The Maryland court in Gutridge apparently added an exclusion 
for acts done in furtherance of a crime in the presence of the spouse.24 
Other courts, however, have held that this "criminal" testimony is 
within the privilege. They feel that a husband is not likely to do a 
criminal act in public, and, therefore, he must have done the act in re-
liance on the confidence of the marital relation.25 
In the principal case the Maryland Court of Appeals appears to 
have taken the view that an act cannot be a confidential communica-
tion within the marital privilege unless the wife understood the in-
formation which the husband was trying to convey to her. This 
approach seems to ignore the basic policy of the marital privilege: to 
preserve the intimacy which is essential to the well-being of a marriage 
by encouraging spouses to confide in one another. The question in 
each case should not be whether the observing spouse understood what 
the other was trying to say by means of the act, but whether the 
communicating spouse intended the act to be a confidential communi-
cation. The fact that the defendant in this case did not succeed in his 
attempt to transmit information to his wife, because she did not under-
stand the significance of his act, should have been immaterial. 
Punitive Damages: Punishment of an 
Insured Defendant? 
Carroway v. Johnson1 
The plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries sustained in an auto-
mobile collision and was awarded a judgment in the amount of $5,000 
actual damages and $1,500 punitive damages. The defendant's insur-
ance company had refused to defend her in that action or to pay the 
judgment obtained, relying upon an employee exclusion clause in the 
policy. The plaintiff thereupon sued the defendant on the judgment, 
this time joining the insurer as co-defendant, and won a verdict to 
recover against the insurer the aforesaid amount. The insurance com-
pany appealed, questioning its liability for punitive damages. 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed, holding that the 
insurer's obligation under an automobile liability policy requiring it 
to pay "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of ... bodily injury ... sustained by any 
person ... arising out of the ... use of the owned automobile or any 
non-owned automobile" did embrace the obligation to pay an award 
24. See note 4 supra. . 
25. People v. Daghita, 299 N.Y. 194, 86 N.E.2d 172, 174 (1949). The following 
cases do not expressly use the same reasoning but by implication reach the same result: 
Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 55 S.E.2d 9, 15 (1949); State v. Robbins, 35 
Wash. 2d 389, 213 P.2d 310, 313 (1950). 
1. 245 S.c. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965). 
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for punitive damages. The court said that "liability policies have been 
held to cover punitive, as well as compensatory, damages"2 and that 
the "majority of courts ... have imposed liability upon the insurer 
even though the recovery was based upon wilful or wanton conduct 
[as distinguished from intentional wrongdoing], or even though the 
verdict may have included punitive damages."3 Although noting the 
maxim that a policy "must be construed most liberally in favor of the 
insured and where the words ... are ambiguous, or ... capable of 
two reasonable interpretations, that construction will be adopted which 
is most favorable to the insured,"4 the court found no ambiguity and 
held that the policy must be enforced according to its express terms, 
like any other contract. According to the court, punitive damages were 
included in the "sums" which the insured was "legally obligated to pay" 
under the policy; therefore, the contract, construed on its face, clearly 
encompassed punitive as well as compensatory awards as "damages 
because of ... bodily injury." A factor which the court did not stress, 
but which very well may have motivated its decision, is the notion that 
the average person who takes out an automobile insurance policy 
contemplates protection against claims of any character.5 
The holding in this case is undoubtedly in accord with the pre-
vailing case law on the subject,S but is it sound in the light of public 
policy? Should the law permit one to insure himself against liability 
for torts resulting from his own wilful or wanton misconduct? 
The majority of cases have held that an award of punitive damages 
comes within the coverage of an automobile liability policy insuring 
against loss resulting from death or bodily injuries,7 and that such 
policies include recovery for wilful or wanton misconduct.s One court 
reasoned that, since acts of wanton and reckless character come essen-
tially within the scope of negligence and since punitive damages are 
imposed because of a particularly negligent act, such damages are 
covered by the policy.9 Almost all of the cases holding the insurer liable 
for punitive as well as compensatory damages have been careful to 
note the distinction between wilful or wanton misconduct and inten-
2. Id. at 910. The court was quoting from ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 4900 (1942). 
3. Ibid. The court again quoted ApPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 4312. 
4. Id. at 909. 
5. In support the court cited ApPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 4312. The court 
may have been influenced also by the fact that the insurer in this case was reluctant to 
pay any damages at all, as evidenced by its refusal to defend the insured in the 
original action. 
6. See Annot., 173 A.L.R. 503, 506 (1947), 132 A.L.R. 1262 (1941). Note also, 
7 AM. JUR. 2d Automobile Insurance §§ 92 and 196 (1963); and 45 c.J.S. Insurance 
§ 827 (1946). 
7. E.g., United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. 
Cal. 1943); Capital Motor Lines v. Loring, 238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897 (1939); 
Employers Ins. Co. v. Brock, 233 Ala. 551, 172 So. 671 (1937). See also ApPLEMAN, 
op. cit. supra note 2, § 4900, and 6 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 3997 (1945). 
8. American Fidelity & c. Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935). See 
also 6 BLASHFIELD, op. cit. supra note 7, § 3997. 
9. The court stated, "Since this policy clearly covers bodily damage through 
negligence and since these punitive damages are imposed because of the aggravated 
circumstances or form of this negligence, such punitive damages must be regarded as 
coming within the meaning of the policy." Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Welfare Finance 
Co., 75 F.2d 58, 59 (8th Cir. 1934). 
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tional misconduct.10 The view seems to be that, although no person 
should be allowed to benefit from or insure himself against liability for 
his own intentional wrongdoings,l1 there is nothing wrong with per-
mitting him to insure against his own negligent acts, however wanton 
or reckless they may be. The law of insurance thus adopts the thin 
line between gross negligence and intentional misconduct - almost 
always a purely factual question for the jury's determination - as its 
test of insurer liability. 
There is a strong current of opinion which declines to accept this 
view and refuses to recognize the distinction between wilful or wanton 
acts and intentional acts, especially when such misconduct involves 
the use of a motor vehicle. 12 This group of courts takes the position 
that, the automobile being an inherently dangerous instrumentality, 
one should not be able to insure himself against his grossly negligent 
or reckless driving. Therefore, when punitive damages are assessed, 
it does not matter whether the driver's conduct was intentional or 
negligent; the mere fact that punitive damages have been levied renders 
him personally liable for them and not subject to any indemnification 
by way of insurance. 
Thus, in the Connecticut case of Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty 
CO./3 an insurer under a policy substantially the same as that issued 
in the principal case, and in a similar automobile collision situation, 
was held not liable for payment of double or treble damages as provided 
by the specific statute being construed. The court there ruled that the 
punitive damages were not included within the scope of the policy 
because "the additional award ... is imposed upon an offending driver 
as punishment"14 and the misconduct had "the aspects of a wrong to 
the public rather than to the individual."15 
10. E.g., Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Casualty Insulance Co.. v. 
Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); General Casualty Co. of America v. Woodby, 
238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956) ; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 
(6th Cir. 1943); Rothman v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 241, 16 
N.E.2d 417 (1938) (distinguished in Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 
307 F.2d 422, 438 (5th Cir. 1962» ; Herrell v. Hickok, 57 Ohio App. 213, 13 N.E.2d 
358 (1937); Sheehan v. Goriansky, 321 Mass. 200, 72 N.E.2d 538, 541, 173 A.L.R. 497 
(1947) (which took the view that if the act were "wilful," it was intentional and 
therefore not within the coverage of the policy) ; Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters 
Ins. Co., 383 S.W. 2d 1 (Tenn. 1964). 
11. LoRocco v. N.J. Manufacturers Indemnity Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 
A.2d 591 (1964); Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 133 N.E.2d 
432, 19 A.L.R. 876 (1921). COlltra, Jernigan v. Allstate Ins. Co.,269 F.2d 353 (5th 
Cir. 1959). 
12. See, e.g., Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity Company, 37 Cal. Rptr. IS (1964) ; 
Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964). 
13. 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941). 
14. Id. at 359. The punishment involved here was for violation of a statute which 
made persons neglecting to conform to the laws of the road liable to one injured as a 
result of the violation of such laws in double or treble damages if, in the discretion of 
the court, double or treble damages should seem just. 
15. Ibid. The court in this case tried to distinguish the facts of several of the 
cases mentioned as favoring the majority rule, citing specifically American Fidelity 
& Casualty Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935) and Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. 
v. Welfare Finance Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934). But it is doubtful that those cases 
could be validly distinguished, and even more improbable that the later cases such as 
Pennsylvania Threshermen and Farmers' Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Thornton, 
244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957) and General Casualty Company of America v. Woodby, 
238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956) could have been. Indeed, one court, dealing specifically 
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By far the most carefully analyzed and well-reasoned decision 
involving the public policy question is N orthwestern National Casualty 
Company v. McNulty.16 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
5th Circuit found it unnecessary to construe the insurance contract, 
holding merely that public policy prohibits insurance against liability 
for punitive damages.17 "The force of public policy on insurance cover-
ing punitive damages is that of a penalty, levied against the defendant 
as a punishment, to deter him and others from similar conduct.»18 The 
court thus recognized that punitive damages differ from compensatory 
damages.19 As another court said, "Punitive or exemplary damages is 
an amount allowed over and above actual or compensatory damages. 
Its allowance depends on malice, moral turpitude, wantonness, Or the 
outrageousness of the tort and is awarded as a deterrent to others 
inclined to commit a like offense."2o To allow insurance for punitive 
damages would be to frustrate the purposes of such assessments: 
punishment and deterrence.21 
Although the doctrine that "no one shall be permitted to take 
advantage of his own wrong" (the term "wrong" given a broad inter-
pretation)22 provides some force to the argument that insurance against 
punitive damages would run counter to public policy, it is by no means 
the sole rationale. As the court in M cN ulty stated: 
The policy considerations . . . where . . . punitive damages 
are awarded for punishment and deterrence, would seem to re-
quire that the damages rest ultimately as well nominally [sic] on 
the party actually responsible for the wrong. If that person were 
permitted to shift the burden to an insurance company, punitive 
damages would serve no useful purpose .... [T]here is no point 
in punishing the insurance company; it has done no wrong. In 
with the public policy question involved in Tedesco, said, "We see no difference in 
principle between public policy as established by the legislature and public policy estab-
lished by the judiciary," thus discarding a distinction made by Tedesco. Northwestern 
National Casualty Company v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, at 437 (5th Cir. 1962). See 
also 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 144, 149 (1957) and 14 Mo. L. REv. 175, 176 (1949). 
16. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). 
17. Id. at 434. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Contra, Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117 (1882), where the court stated, at 121 : 
Compensatory damages are such as arise from actual and indirect pecuniary loss, 
mental suffering, value of time, actual expenses, and to these may be added 
bodily pain and suffering. Exemplary, vindictive or punitory damages are such 
as blend together the interests of society and of the aggrieved individual, and are 
not only a recompense to the sufferer but a punishment to the offender and an 
example to the community. 
See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 903 and OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND 
PROPERTY § 269.540.1 (1961). For a general discussion, see Morris, Punitive Dam-
ages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1173 (1931). 
It should be pointed out that two states, Connecticut and Michigan, consider 
punitive damages to be compensatory in nature. Hanna v. Sweeny, 78 Conn. 492, 62 
At!. 785 (1906); Hoisted v. VanWagnen, 243 Mich. 350, 220 N.W. 762 (1926). 
20. Dr. P. Phillips & Sons, Inc. v. Kilgore, 152 Fla. 578, 12 So. 2d 465, 467 (1943). 
21. "It is not disputed that insurance against criminal fines or penalties would be 
void as violative of public policy. The same public policy should invalidate any con-
tract of insurance against the civil punishment that punitive damages represent." 
Northwestern National Casualty Company v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th 
Cir. 1962). 
22. Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 133 N.E.2d 432, 19 
A.L.R. 876 (1921) (Cardozo, J.). 
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actual fact, ... the burden would ultimately come to rest ... on 
the public, since the added liability to the insurance companies 
would be passed along to the premium payers. Society would then 
be punishing itself for the wrong committed by the insured.23 
This element of personal punishment seems all the more important 
when considering that the nature of the offense is the use of an in-
herently dangerous motor vehicle on public highways,24 and a verdict 
which includes punitive damages is justifiable only if it is the driver 
who pays.25 
The court in McNulty adopted a rather broad standard: where 
punitive damages are awarded, no indemnity should be allowed the 
insured party.26 In so doing it distinguished those decisions relied 
upon by the principal case,27 stating that in each of those cases the 
plaintiff received a lump sum judgment for compensatory and punitive 
damages.28 Such, however, was not the situation in the present Car-
roway case, which thus appears to be in direct contrast with McNulty.29 
Although the issues of construction of the contract and public 
policy overiap,30 most courts have refrained from coming directly to 
23. Northwestern National Casualty Company v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440-41 
(5th Cir. 1962). See also Ertsgaard, Liability Beyond Insurance Policy Limits, 425 
INS. L.J. 404 (1958). 
24. "Our highway safety problems have greatly increased. Death and destruction 
stalk our roads. The peaceful Sunday afternoon family drive through the hills has 
been abandoned by many as the result of brushes with near death at the hands of 
half-baked morons drunkenly weaving in and out of traffic at 80 or 90 miles per hour." 
Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. App. 1964). 
25. Certain practical difficulties in allowing insurance against punitive damages 
are also noted by the court in Northwestern National Casualty Company v. McNulty, 
307 F.2d 432, 441 (5th Cir. 1962) : "(1) It would produce a serious conflict of interest 
between the insurer and the insured in settlement negotiations and in trial tactics ... 
(2) There would be a conflict between the rule that in assessing punitive damages 
evidence of the financial standing of the defendant may be considered by the jury 
and the rule against referring to the defendant's insurance in the presence of the 
jury. (3) Fantastic results would be possible having no relation to making the injured 
party whole [where, for example, actual damages awarded are minute compared to 
punitive assessments.]" See also 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, 527 (1957). 
26. In a specially concurring opinion, Judge Gewin said that this test is too broad, 
that the term "punitive damages" is too loose, vague, indefinite and uncertain. Some-
times compensatory damages embrace and blend with punitive damages. The more 
appropriate basis, the Judge submits, is a consideration of "the nature of the conduct 
of the wrongdoer - not the nature of the damages awarded. If the defendant acted 
willfully, intentionally, maliciously or fraudulently, coverage should be denied. . . ." 
Northwestern National Casualty Company v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 445 (5th Cir. 
1962). But this test appears difficult to apply, since the jury is asked to distinguish 
between grossly negligent and intentional misconduct. See Tomerlin v. Canadian 
Indemnity Company, 37 Cal. Reptr. 15 (1964) and Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 
(Mo. App. 1964). 
27. American Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 
(935); Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. 
Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957). 
28. "The failure to award separate amounts ... presented an obstacle ... since 
the appellate court could not make a separation itself." Northwestern National 
Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 422, 439 (1962). The jury should always be 
required to separately designate the amount of punitive damages and the amount of 
compensatory damages in order to avoid the pitfalls of lump-sum verdicts. See 46 
VA. L. REv. 1036, 1050 (1960). 
29. Another case subsequent to McNulty, and diametrically opposed to its result, 
is Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964). 
30. See Universal Indemnity Insurance Company v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 
776 (1934). 
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grips with the latter.81 It has been left to the various commentators to 
deal with the policy question, and the overwhelming majority of them 
have agreed with the principle espoused by McNulty. The principle 
behind their reasoning is that an insurance company which has done 
no wrong should not be punished because of its insured's wrongdoings. 
The nature of the policy contemplates compensatory damages arising 
out of an accident, but not punitive damages awarded because the policy 
holder has acted in a careless or reckless manner. Should the insurer 
be held for punitive damages, the essential reasons for such an award -
to punish the wrongdoer himself and to deter others - would be 
frustrated. 82 
In reaching its conclusion, the court in Carroway relied heavily 
on the ideas that punitive damages do not in fact deter future wrong 
actions, and that when one takes out a policy which does not specifically 
exclude punitive damages, he expects to be fully covered for any judg-
ment rendered against him.33 These arguments are not without merit, 
but public policy focuses upon a weightier consideration: to protect 
society by forcing the wrongdoer, not the innocent insurance company, 
to pay the penalty. An important exception to basic contract theory 
must be established here, where the misconduct takes on the character 
of a wrong to the public rather than to the individual. 
In Maryland the problem is still largely a moot one since exem-
plary or punitive damages may not be recovered in an action for injuries 
arising out of the operation of an automobile in the absence of fraud, 
malice, evil intent or oppression.34 "In automobile negligence cases 
31. See McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 1962); also Logan, Punitive 
Damages in Automobile Cases, 1961 INS. L.J. 27, 30. The principal case also em-
phasizes construction of the contract instead of a public policy consideration. 
32. See generally OU;CK, op. cit. supra note 19 § 275C (1961); Note, Exemplary 
Damages i,~ the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. RJ<:v. 517 (1957); Note, Insurance Cover-
age and the Punitive Award in Automobile Accident Suits, 19 U. PITT. L. REv. 144 
(1957); Comment, Punitive Damages and Their Possible Application in Automobile 
Accident Litigation, 46 VA. L. RJ<:v. 1036 (1960); Comment, Damages - Intoxicated 
Driver - Punitive Damages, 46 IOWA L. REv. 645 (1961). 
Appleman is the only major commentator on the subject to disagree. ApPUMAN, 
op. cit. supra note 2, § 4312. Appleman's 1965 Supplement to this section notes the 
dissenting voice of McNulty and offers a rebuttal, based largely on conjecture as to 
how the author himself (Appleman) might have met that court's persuasive argu-
ments, and emphasizing the construction of the specific policy: "Mr. Appleman's 
arguments apply with equal force to punitive damages. In any event a court should 
not aid an insurer which fails to exclude liability for punitive damages. Surely there 
is nothing in the insuring clause that would forewarn an insured that such was to be 
the intent of the parties." 
It has been argued that legislatures have determined public policy in favor of 
holding the insurer liable for punitive damages, and that punitive damages are in fact 
compensatory and not penal, but it is difficult to justify these positions. "Legislatures 
in truth have not considered the problem, public policy neither demands nor suggests 
excessive recoveries and common sense dictates that punitive damages are penal in 
nature. It is certainly not socially desirable that the insured be protected from the 
consequences of his wanton conduct since the insured, knowing of this protection, is 
more apt to use less care even to the point of malicious behavior, than were he 
uninsured." Note, 19 U. PITT. L. RJ<:v. 144, 154 (1957). 
33. In Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964), 
the court used similar arguments to reach the same conclusion. 
34. Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 133, 36 A.2d 699, 701 (1944). The public policy 
problem still has relevance in Maryland, however, in diversity of citizenship cases. 
See, e.g., McNulty, 307 F.2d at 434 (5th Cir. 1962). 
332 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXV 
the Maryland court obviously is of the opinion that criminal statutes 
are a better deterrent than civil penalties."35 
In the light of well-reasoned public policy, liability insurance con-
tracts such as the one involved in the principal case should not be held 
to embrace an award of punitive damages. Instead, an exception should 
be made to the rule that a policy be construed in favor of the insured 
party, where the insurer has not specifically included coverage for 
punitive damages in the contract.36 Courts should recognize that in 
this area, punitive damages ought to be assessed only against the in-
sured, and not against the insurer.* 
Eminent Domain - Economic Motivations In 
Determining "Necessity" For A Taking 
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land 
in Ingham County, Michigan! 
The United States moved for summary judgment in a civil action 
instituted for the taking of property under the power of eminent 
domain.2 The government sought to acquire the land in fee simple, 
even though it was to be used solely for the purpose of providing fill 
material for the construction of a proposed highway.3 The court, in 
35. Gittings v. Zellan, 160 F.2d 585, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1947). Maryland apparently 
takes the position that, where the driver's conduct is so reprehensible as to warrant 
punishment, the case becomes one for the criminal courts, thereby withdrawing it 
from the realm of the accident insurance policy. 
It should be noted that there is a strong current of thought in the law today 
which favors the total abolition of punitive damages in civil cases, on the ground that 
if the defendant's activity was so gross as to necessitate punishment, then "the criminal 
court is obviously the arena where society's vindication best lies: whatever the theory 
of criminal law one chooses - punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation - the criminal 
court, with its flexibility in sentencing, its vast experience with wrongdoers, and its 
staff of parole, probation and other experts, is best equipped to achieve society's ends." 
Conrad, Punitive Damages: A Challenge to the Defense, 5 FOR THE DEFENSE 2 (1964). 
36. There is no doubt that the insurer would be free from liability where coverage 
for punitive damages is specifically excluded from the policy. Northwestern National 
Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 Fold 432, 443 (1962). But it is questionable whether 
courts should go so far as to hold that, should a policy specifically provide for such 
punitive damages coverage, it would contravene public policy, as did the tribunal 
in McNulty, 307 Fold at 434. 
* Editor's tlote: As this issue of the REVIEW went to press, the District Court of 
Florida decided the case of Nicholson v. American Fire and Casualty Insurance Com-
pany, 177 Soold 152 (Fla. 1965), which followed the principle laid down by the 
McNulty decision and the policy advocated by this casenote. 
1. 233 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Mich. 1964). 
2. The proposed taking was by authority of 25 Stat. 357 (1888) as amended, 
40 U.S.c. § 257 (1964),46 Stat. 1421-22 (1931),40 U.S.c. §§ 258(a)-(e) (1964), 
and 72 Stat. 893 (1958), as amended, 23 U.S.c. § 107 (1964), which authorize the 
acquisition of land or interests in land required to construct any section of the 
National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. 
3. The court summarily disposed of all inquiry into the public use aspects of 
the condemnation when it stated, "The authorities are clear that the condemnor can 
enter adjoining land and condemn materials required for construction." 233 F. Supp. 
at 544. 
